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During the Warren Court era, a heady period of expansive jurisprudence,1
Miranda v. Arizona was especially noteworthy because the United States
Supreme Court used that decision to dramatically revise its confessions
jurisprudence.2 Miranda extended the privilege against self-incrimination
to custodial interrogations and represented an effort by the Court to gain
control of the police and their investigatory procedures by regulating the
interrogations process—and, specifically, by requiring the police to
administer a Miranda warning to suspects before engaging in custodial
interrogation.3 The decision also had the effect, perhaps unintended, of
educating the public regarding its rights, as subsequent movies and
television shows depicted the police administering the Miranda warnings.

* Professor of Law and Distinguished University Scholar, University of Louisville,
Louis D. Brandeis School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Id. at 444–45.
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In some respects, the Miranda decision was relatively uncontroversial
because the Court did little more than require the police to inform
suspects of their rights and prescribe procedures for the waiver of those
rights. But Miranda’s holding was not inevitable. In the Court’s later
decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the Court held that suspects can
consent to searches of their persons or property even though they have
not been informed that they have a Fourth Amendment right to refuse
consent.4 A critic of Schneckloth might legitimately question how suspects
can validly waive Fourth Amendment rights that they do not know they
possess and why the police should not be required to inform suspects of
their rights before seeking a waiver. Miranda, at least, avoids this
criticism by requiring that suspects receive such information.
As will be developed more fully below, despite the limited nature of
the Miranda decision and the advantages that flow from its media impact,
Miranda was not a panacea for the Court’s confessions jurisprudence.
In Miranda, the Court tried to sort out a muddled area of jurisprudence,
but it is not clear that the Court succeeded.
I. PRE-MIRANDA CONFESSIONS JURISPRUDENCE
In the years leading up to Miranda, the Court struggled to find its
footing in the confessions area. For decades, the Court evaluated confessions
under the due process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
For example, in Brown v. Mississippi, the Court rejected confessions that
were obtained by whipping defendants with a leather strap that had
buckles attached to it, as well as by hanging men by their necks from a
tree.5 In concluding that the confessions were coerced, the Court held
that the “rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness
stand” without violating due process.6
Although the Court applied due process analysis in a number of cases
following the Brown decision,7 the test never proved to be entirely
satisfactory. A number of Justices expressed concern about the fact that
too many confessions cases devolved into swearing matches regarding
what the police had done, and whether the defendants had been coerced
into involuntary confessions.8 As Justice Douglas noted in one dissent,
4. 412 U.S. 218, 248–49 (1973).
5. 297 U.S. 278, 281–82 (1936).
6. Id. at 285–86.
7. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513–14 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois,
372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321–24 (1959); Ashcraft
v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944).
8. See RUSSELL L. WEAVER, LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, RONALD BACIGAL, JOHN M.
BURKOFF, CATHERINE HANCOCK & DONALD E. LIVELY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 433 n.3
(2d ed. 2004).
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the “trial on the issue of coercion is seldom helpful,” with the police
“usually testify[ing] one way, the accused another.”9 He concluded that
the nature of the process gives defendants “little chance to prove coercion at
trial.”10
As the Court’s dissatisfaction with the due process test grew, the
Court began searching for alternative ways to deal with confessions
issues. In McNabb v. United States11 and Mallory v. United States,12 the
Court relied on a federal statute13 and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure14 to establish the proposition that a criminal defendant must
be arraigned “without unnecessary delay” and that a confession obtained
during the delay might be excluded from a subsequent prosecution.15
However, this so-called McNabb-Mallory rule never developed into a
constitutional rule, and Congress attempted to overrule it by subsequent
legislation.16 By the time of the subsequent legislation, the McNabbMallory rule had been effectively supplanted by the Miranda decision.
Then, the Court flirted with the possibility of using the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel as a way to deal with custodial interrogations. This approach
involved a radical reinterpretation of the right to counsel, which had
previously been viewed as applying only at the trial stage.17 Although
counsel must be appointed sufficiently far in advance of trial to allow for
adequate preparation, the right was not applicable to preindictment
interrogations.18 The case of Cicenia v. Lagay presented the Court with
an extraordinary opportunity to extend the right to counsel to custodial
interrogations.19 In that case, not only did Cicenia request the right to
speak with his attorney, the attorney was present at the stationhouse
9. See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 443–44 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting,
joined by Warren, C.J., Black & Brennan, JJ.), overruled by Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
10. Id. at 444.
11. 318 U.S. 332, 344–45 (1943), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, as
recognized in United States v. Pugh, 25 F.3d 669, 675 (8th Cir. 1994).
12. 354 U.S. 449, 455 (1957), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, as
recognized in United States v. Pugh, 25 F.3d 669, 675 (8th Cir. 1994).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 595 (1945) (current version at 18 U.S.C. app. R. 5(a) (2000)).
14. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
15. Mallory, 354 U.S. at 455.
16. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
§ 701(a), 82 Stat. 197, 210 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000)).
17. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
18. Id.
19. 357 U.S. 504, 506–07 (1958), overruled by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
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demanding to speak to him, and remained at the stationhouse throughout
the entire afternoon trying to meet with his client.20 The police precluded
Cicenia from speaking to his attorney by secluding him in a room, and
ultimately preventing the two from speaking until after Cicenia confessed.
Although the Court expressed distaste for the police practices in the
Cicenia case, it upheld the conviction on grounds that defendant’s right
to counsel was not violated: “New Jersey is not alone in its rule that an
accused has no right to consult with counsel during the period between
arrest and arraignment.”21
In the landmark decision Massiah v. United States, the Court shifted
course and used the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to exclude a
confession that was obtained from a criminal defendant who had been
indicted and for whom counsel had been appointed.22 When the police
surreptitiously interrogated Massiah through an informant, the Court
held that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated.23
The Court extended Massiah in Escobedo v. Illinois. Escobedo involved
a defendant who was implicated in a murder, taken into custody, and
transported to the police station.24 The police rejected Escobedo’s repeated
requests to speak with his attorney, and they also rejected his attorney’s
requests to speak with him until the police had completed their
interrogation.25 Applying a “critical stage” analysis,26 the Court held that
the right to counsel applied to the interrogation because, otherwise,
defendant’s confession could prejudice his trial, and rights “may be as
irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted, as they are when an
accused represented by counsel waives a right for strategic purposes.”27
Escobedo held that the right to counsel attaches when “the investigation
is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect.”28
II. THE MIRANDA REVOLUTION
In Miranda, the Court took its confessions jurisprudence in an entirely
different direction, and ultimately retreated from Escobedo (but not
Massiah), basing its decision on the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination rather than on due process or the Sixth Amendment
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
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Id. at 505.
Id. at 510 n.4.
377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
Id.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 479 (1964).
Id. at 481.
Id. at 486.
Id. (quoting Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961)).
Id. at 490.
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right to counsel.29 As with the Court’s decision to extend the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in Massiah, this extension of the privilege
against self-incrimination was problematic in terms of prior precedent.
The privilege against self-incrimination had not previously been applied
to custodial interrogation situations that occurred prior to the commencement
of the adversary process.
Miranda was a striking decision because the Court relied extensively
on police interrogation manuals advocating the use of psychological
techniques rather than torture. For example, the manuals advised police
to isolate suspects in private situations—the stationhouse—where the
police have all the advantages30 and where the “atmosphere suggests the
invincibility of the forces of the law.”31 During the interrogation process,
the police are urged “to display an air of confidence in the suspect’s guilt
and from outward appearance to maintain only an interest in confirming
certain details.”32 The suspect’s guilt is taken as fact, and the interrogator
encourages the suspect to confess by directing
his comments toward the reasons why the subject committed the act, rather than
court failure by asking the subject whether he did it. Like other men, perhaps
the subject has had a bad family life, had an unhappy childhood, had too much
to drink, had an unrequited desire for women.33

The police are also instructed to
minimize the moral seriousness of the offense, to cast blame on the victim or on
society. These tactics are designed to put the subject in a psychological state
where his story is but an elaboration of what the police purport to know
already—that he is guilty. Explanations to the contrary are dismissed and
discouraged. 34

If these techniques do not succeed, the interrogator is instructed to resort
to more aggressive techniques such as the “Mutt and Jeff” technique.35
While the Court did not view these psychological techniques as
rendering confessions involuntary in traditional terms, it did conclude
that such tactics exact “a heavy toll on individual liberty and trade[] on

29. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966).
30. Id. at 450 (citing CHARLES E. O’HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
99 (1956)).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 452.
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the weakness of individuals.”36 The Court emphasized that such interrogation
techniques produce “inherently compelling pressures.”37 In an effort to
provide “adequate protective devices” against these psychological tactics
and prevent a suspect from being forced to incriminate himself, the
Court required police to administer the Miranda warning and comply
with the procedures outlined in its decision.38 In other words, the police
were required to respect a suspect’s assertion of his right to remain silent
and his right to counsel.
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH MIRANDA
It is not clear that the Miranda decision has turned out to be a panacea
to the confessions problem. For one thing, there was an important disconnect
in Miranda. Although the Court spent a good deal of time discussing
interrogation manuals and psychological techniques in its opinion, there
was no evidence that the manuals had been relied upon or used against
any of the defendants whose cases were consolidated before the Court.
As Justice Clark noted in his concurrence:
The materials [the Court] refers to as “police manuals” are, as I read them,
merely writings in this field by professors and some police officers. Not one is
shown by the record here to be the official manual of any police department,
much less in universal use in crime detection.39

Indeed, issues related to the manuals were raised in amicus briefs rather
than by the parties to the case. Moreover, Miranda did not involve proof
that any of the confessions before the Court were either coerced or
unreliable. Indeed, there was evidence to the contrary. As Justice Harlan
argued in dissent, “These confessions were obtained during brief, daytime
questioning conducted by two officers and unmarked by any of the
traditional indicia of coercion. . . . There was, in sum, a legitimate purpose,
no perceptible unfairness, and certainly little risk of injustice in the
interrogation.”40
Because there was no proof of coercion in Miranda itself, or necessarily
in other cases where the police failed to give the Miranda warnings, it
was easy to argue that unwarned confessions should not be suppressed.
While the Court has generally reaffirmed Miranda, the Court did attempt
to distinguish Miranda in its subsequent decision in Michigan v.
Tucker.41 In Tucker, the Court held that a voluntary confession should not
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
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Id. at 467.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 499 (Clark, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Id. at 518–19 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
417 U.S. 433 (1974).
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be excluded from evidence even though Miranda’s dictates were not
observed.42 The Court regarded the Miranda warnings as prophylactic
and held that a mere failure to comply with Miranda’s warning
requirement did not necessarily result in a “breach [of] the right against
compulsory self-incrimination.”43 As the Court later said in Oregon v.
Elstad, the failure to warn was not an “actual infringement of the
suspect’s constitutional rights.”44
Even though Tucker has not gained ascendance in post-Miranda
jurisprudence, the decision does reveal some of the inherent problems in
Miranda. As noted, Miranda tended to assume that the custodial interrogation
environment is inherently coercive. But, if the Court’s assumption is
correct, it is difficult to understand how Miranda’s requirement of
prophylactic warnings provides adequate protection for suspects being
interrogated. After the Miranda warning is administered, the suspect remains
in what the Court assumes to be an “inherently coercive” context, and
the mere administration of the warnings might not be sufficient to
overcome the coercion. In Miranda itself, the Court recognized this fact
when it stated that the “circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation
can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware
of his privilege by his interrogators.”45 The Miranda Court attempted to
respond to this concern by providing suspects with the right to counsel,
as well as by requiring the police to inform suspects of their rights.46
But as Justice White argued in dissent in Miranda:
If the defendant may not answer without a warning a question such as “Where
were you last night?” without having his answer be a compelled one, how can
the Court ever accept his negative answer to the question of whether he wants to
consult his retained counsel or counsel whom the court will appoint?47

There is much force to Justice White’s argument. When the decision
about whether to waive is made, the circumstances are stacked in favor
of the police. The police can isolate a suspect in an interrogation room
before attempting to seek a waiver. Although the Miranda warning provides
suspects with some information, many suspects will understand little
else about criminal law or the rules of evidence. For example, suspects
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 445–46.
Id. at 445.
470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985).
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469.
Id.
Id. at 536 (White, J., dissenting).

445

WEAVER.DOC

11/9/2007 11:25:42 AM

may believe that they can talk themselves out of the situation by offering
an alibi or other excuse and may not understand that they are making
incriminating admissions or otherwise prejudicing their future defense.
By the time suspects realize that they should have kept quiet, it may be
too late. Moreover, if suspects fail to assert their rights, the police are
free to utilize many of the interrogation techniques outlined in Miranda.
Another potential problem with the Miranda decision is that once the
warnings are administered, the Court is much more likely to find that
any ensuing confession is voluntary and admissible.48 For example, in
Connecticut v. Barrett, after being given a Miranda warning, the defendant
signed a form stating that he would not give a written statement unless
his attorney was present, but that he had “no problem” talking about the
crime.49 Several times thereafter, defendant made it clear that he would
not give a written statement, but that he was willing to give an oral
statement. The Court rejected the argument that defendant’s knowledge
regarding the consequences of an oral statement was sufficiently incomplete
as to nullify his consent: “Miranda gives the defendant a right to choose
between speech and silence, and Barrett chose to speak.”50 The Court
also rejected the argument that Barrett’s distinction between oral and written
statements indicated “an understanding of the consequences so incomplete
that we should deem his limited invocation of the right to counsel
effective for all purposes.”51 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall,
dissented, arguing that Barrett had effectively requested counsel.52
Also illustrative of the insulating effect of a Miranda warning on the
validity of a confession is the holding in Moran v. Burbine.53 In that
case, the defendant was in custody when his sister obtained a lawyer to
represent him. The lawyer telephoned the police station, but was told
that the police “were through with [the interrogation] for the night.”54
About an hour later, the police resumed their questioning of Burbine,
who waived his privilege against self-incrimination.55 The Court concluded
that the waiver was valid: “Events occurring outside of the presence of
the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on

48. See, e.g., Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987); Connecticut v.
Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 530 (1987); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1994);
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296–97 (1988). But see Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S.
600, 616–17 (2004).
49. Barrett, 479 U.S. at 525.
50. Id. at 529.
51. Id. at 530.
52. Id. at 536–37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986).
54. Id. at 417.
55. Id.
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the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional
right.”56
Part of the justification for the decisions in both Barrett and Moran is
that there was no evidence that either defendant was coerced into
incriminating himself, in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, or that either confession was necessarily so
unreliable that its admission violated due process. That said, the known
circumstances regarding each case are sufficiently disturbing, and the
available facts sufficiently limited, so that one might legitimately question
whether the confessions were really voluntary and informed.
IV. WERE THERE ALTERNATIVES?
As a prophylactic decision, Miranda—and its requirement of a
warning—seems sensible enough, and it is not clear that other alternatives
would have been as effective. One thing that the Court could have done
in Miranda was to require the presence of counsel for every custodial
interrogation. While this step might have been extremely effective in
ensuring that confessions are not coerced, there are perhaps good
reasons why Miranda did not opt to require counsel. For one thing, the
cost of such a requirement would be substantial. The states already incur
significant costs related to Gideon v. Wainwright,57 and the requirement
that states provide indigents with appointed counsel before subjecting
them to the penalty of imprisonment.58 If states were required to provide
suspects with counsel for all custodial interrogations, these costs would
escalate dramatically. It is unlikely that the Court would impose such a
requirement on the states.
Dissenting in Miranda, Justice White, joined by Justices Harlan and
Stewart, suggested a number of alternative steps the Court could have
taken in lieu of imposing a warning requirement. Specifically, he suggested
that:
Even if one were to postulate that the Court’s concern is [that some] confessions
induced by police interrogation are coerced . . . and present judicial procedures
are believed to be inadequate to identify the confessions that are coerced and
those that are not, it would still not be essential to impose the rule that the
Court has now fashioned. Transcripts or observers could be required, specific
time limits, tailored to fit the cause, could be imposed, or other devices could be
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 422.
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
See WEAVER ET AL., supra note 8, at 51 n.1.
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utilized to reduce the chances that otherwise indiscernible coercion will produce
an inadmissible confession.59

It is not clear that any of these steps would have been a panacea either.
While it would be nice to have a transcript of custodial interrogations, a
skillful interrogator can ask questions that will sound perfectly
reasonable in transcript form even though the interrogator’s tone and
inflection are more coercive. Having an observer present in the room
would provide additional insight into police tactics and the potential for
abuse, but it might be costly to mandate that observers be constantly
present. Moreover, while specific time limits might be fine, a coercive
interrogation might still produce a coerced confession within the allowable
time limits.
Another thing that could be done, but by contrast would be relatively
easy and inexpensive, is to require that interrogations be recorded. This
option is attractive because it provides video evidence of what happened
and allows a reviewing court to assess whether a confession really was
coerced. While this option was viable when Miranda was decided, it has
become much more viable in the following decades as the cost of
recording technology has decreased and the quality of such technology
has increased. In many contexts, it should not be difficult to record custodial
interrogations, and to allow the courts to see whether the police have
used coercive techniques to gain a confession. However, a recording
requirement is likely to work better in large jurisdictions that can afford
to install video equipment in a special interrogation room. Moreover,
many interrogations (or, at least, quasi-interrogations) take place outside
the context of police stations—for example, at the place of arrest or on
the way to the police station—so that a recording room might not be
practical. Nevertheless, the court might gain some tangible benefit from
requiring the police to record confessions whenever possible.
A videotaping requirement is potentially beneficial because it does not
alter or affect the dynamics of the interrogation process. One of the concerns
about Miranda was that suspects who were given warnings, or provided
with counsel, might choose to remain silent and refuse to cooperate with
the police. Justice Clark’s Miranda concurrence emphasized that
the interrogation of witnesses is “an essential tool in effective law
enforcement.”60 In his Miranda dissent, Justice Harlan expresses concern
about the fact that the warnings might deter suspects from talking to
police.61 Obviously, a videotaping requirement does not necessarily interfere
59. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 535 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 502 (Clark, J., concurring) (citing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503,
514 (1963)).
61. Id. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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with the interrogation process. Indeed, if the police are concerned about
the effect of videotaping on the process, they can conceal videotaping
machines in unobtrusive places. Justice Harlan described the decision as
“poor constitutional law” and suggested that it “entails harmful consequences
for the country at large”62 because “the thrust of the new rules is to
negate all pressures, to reinforce the nervous or ignorant suspect, and
By contrast,
ultimately to discourage any confession at all.”63
videotaping is passive and would not discourage confessions.
V. CONCLUSION
At forty years, Miranda presents a mixed bag. Miranda had a positive
effect on the confessions process because it encouraged and required the
police to provide suspects with information regarding their Fifth
Amendment rights. Moreover, because the Miranda decision has been
embraced by the media and shown in thousands of television shows and
movies, it has had a very broad and profound educational effect. On the
other hand, although Miranda attempted to articulate a bright-line rule
designed to avoid the confusing problems created by preexisting
confessions law, it is not clear that Miranda succeeded. The Court did
create a bright-line rule—for example, before engaging in custodial
interrogation, a suspect must be given a Miranda warning and must
voluntarily waive his rights—but it is not clear that this rule has
accomplished its objective of protecting defendants against inherently
coercive interrogation environments. Moreover, one can argue that
Miranda has an undesirable effect because it encourages courts to affirm
convictions if the Miranda warning has been given.
The net effect is that Miranda has not turned out to be a panacea. It
has not redefined confessions jurisprudence, nor obviated the need to
rely on prior confessions jurisprudence. In subsequent cases, the Court
has been forced to continue to apply due process principles, but with the
same reservations and the same difficulties as before.64 In addition, the
Court has continued to apply the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to
interrogations in Massiah contexts (post-indictment interrogations).65
62. Id. at 504.
63. Id. at 505.
64. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991); Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1986); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978).
65. See, e.g., Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986); Michigan v. Jackson,
475 U.S. 625, 632 (1986); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 400–01 (1977).
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However, the Court seems to have abandoned Escobedo in the sense that
the Court has not applied the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to
suspects who have not been indicted and who are simply the “focus” of a
criminal investigation.66 So, while there is value in the Miranda decision,
especially because of its educational effect, it may be time for further
refinements—for example, requiring videotaping of custodial interrogations.

66.
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See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.

